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SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO. Edited by Mar-
garet E. Hall. With a Foreword by Edwin W. Patterson. New York:
Fallon Law Book Company, 1947. Pp. xxiv, 456. $5.00.
HERE under a single cover are the extra-judicial writings of our great
philosopher-judge. For the most part this book is made up of well-known
materials, including the famous lectures on the judicial process and the
witty and gracious talks on law, literature, opinion writing, the new juris-
prudence, the "game of the law and its prizes," and the "comradeship of
the bar." But there are some new materials of interest: lecture notes from
Professor Nicholas Murray Butler's psychology class; a student essay on
The Moral Element "in Matthew Arnold, suggesting one shaping source for
the Justice's beautiful and lucid prose; and a Columbia Commencement
Oration on The Altruist in Politics. The last, delivered in 1889, was a vigor-
ous condemnation "alike of communism and of socialism that they thwart
the instinct of expansion" or of individual energy and human personality
for the "blind, mechanical power of the State" and suggests some intriguing
comparisons between these early views and the Justice's later constitutional
opinions. Chief Judge Lehman, a close personal friend, contributes a warm
and appreciative memorial. And Professor Patterson, fittingly the first Car-
dozo Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia,* has a foreword which is an
admirable short introduction to Cardozo's juristic philosophy.'
As a collection of selected writings this volume leaves little to be desired.
Set out in clear and attractive type, with a satisfactory index and an ad-
mirable bibliography of writings both by and about the Justice--the latter
in number and caliber strikingly attesting his philosophical and judicial
eminence-this is a book to serve as an evening companion, as well as a
permanent authority of legal reference. I must confess to a slight nostalgia
for the delightful little books containing the original essays. Those seemed
so distinctively in keeping with their gentle and modest author, but, never-
theless, bore testimony to their notable material success in the notations of
a thirteenth printing for The Nature of the Judicial Process and an eighth
for The Growth of the Law. Also-and I realize how purely personal is this
objection-I miss the footnotes at the foot of the page and dislike to have
to flush them from their hiding places in the interstices between chapters.
Of course, I appreciate the shamefaced approach to footnoting shared gen-
erally by nonlegal editors and publishers. But here, as always, Cardozo was
restrained and modest; and; as the original editions show, his concise cita-
tions were not such as to deface the printed page. Yet these are wholly in-
1. More fully developed in his longer monograph, Cardozo's Philosophy of Law, 88
U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 71, 156 (1939).
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significant complaints; the book deserves and will surely have a wide distri-
bution.
In re-reading the essays on the judicial process, I arf impressed with the
freshness and vitality of his approach and how modem it actually is. Not-
withstanding law's stock in trade of hoary antiquities in the shape of both
precedents and texts, much of judicial writing, particularly of judicial philos-
ophy, is quite ephemeral. A judge's philosophy often does not survive the
particular events which gave it birth and shaped its form. We may well
recall the cynic's view that longevity is the one essential attribute for judicial
greatness. But with occasional exceptions the very temporary quality of
judicial thinking has its uses. The dead hand of the law is heavy enough as
it is; our recurring constitutional crises have borne witness to that fact. One
of the surprising facts of contemporary jurisprudence is the amazing recru-
descence of interest in Holmes, not only as hero-where his fame has long
been secure-but as villain, the representative of law as only crude force, the
seducer of the law schools, which, in turn, betrayed the Court.2 How the
old Roman's eyes would have sparkled at that aspect of posthumous fame!
But while Cardozo cannot aspire to quite that kind of lasting regard, his
own claim to permanent recognition is well buttressed.
It is true that Cardozo, in his brief career on the highest court, consciously
followed the Holmes tradition in helping to free welfare legislation from the
shackles of constitutionalism. Here his function was to be a follower. His
own original contributions were elsewhere, first, as a great common-law
judge, and, second, as a unique expositor of the ways of judges. He came to
the work of the Court of Appeals in New York by designation of the Gover-
nor in 1914 after only a month's service in the trial court. This quick rec-
ognition of his outstanding qualities was soon justified through the high
quality of his appellate work. A decision at once scholarly and pathbreaking
in 1917 on pre-existing duty as consideration for a contract won an approv-
ing review from Professor Corbin, who recommended his appointment as
Storrs Lecturer at Yale. As Professor Corbin has written, this invitation he
"hesitatingly accepted," but the lectures as orally delivered in 1921 "were a
triumph," and as subsequently printed "have become a classic." 3 After a
2. See, e.g., Palmer, Hobbes, Holnws and Hitter, 31 A.B.AJ. 5G9 (1945); Gannon,
The Moral Law, 14 FoRD. L. R-v. 1 (1945), 17 N. Y. Sr. B,%u Bul. 49 (1945), 63 PU.
N:Y. ST. BAR Ass'x 383 (1945) ; Kennedy, Portrait of the Nre Supreme Court, 13 Fora.
L. REv. 1 (1944), 14 id. at 8 (1945). Compare my address, Is Law Disappcaring? at
West Virginia University, June, 1946, to be reprinted in 50 IV. VA. L. Q.-(1947).
3. This bit of history appears in Corbin, Mr. Astice Cardoco W:d the Law of Con-
tracts, one of the notable essays in the joint tribute of three universities in January, 1939.
39 CoL L. Rxv. 56, 64, 52 HARv. L. REv. 408, 416, 48 YArx L. J. 426, 434. The case vas
De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, 117 N. E. 607 (1917), reviewed in Corbin, Does A
Pre-existing Duty Defeat Consideration?-Recent Note'worthy Decisions, 27 YA=E L. J.
362 (1918). For the contemporary reaction to the lectures, see also my Cardozo Lecture,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooditw Omnipresence of Erie v. Tomph.ns, 55
YALE L. J. 267 (1946).
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quarter of a century The Nature of the Judicial Process still remains as the
best analysis we have of the judge at work.
It is hard for us now to realize just how "daring" 4 was the task Cardozo
so successfully undertook, for the custom of confessions by judges had not
then become general. Previously there had been no attempt by an American
judge to develop a detailed and consistent philosophy of the process of
judicial adjudication. Cardozo's statement came before the days of the judi-
cial "hunch," indeed of "gastronomical jurisprudence" or what he himself
has called "the cardiac promptings of the moment, the visceral reactions of
one judge or another." 5 But both in what he says as to the freedom of judi-
cial action and as to the restraints which circumscribe a judge, his views
are an unusual combination of balance and restraint, with originality and
freedom of judicial action. His later lectures, those on The Growth of the
Law, at Yale, and on The Paradoxes of Legal Science, at Columbia, supple-
ment his first development of the subject, but hardly match the simple but
frank exposition of the judicial way of life to be found in the earlier lectures.
This is not the place for, nor, in view of what has already been written, is
there need of, another revaluation of the lectures. But I desire to refer to
one matter Cardozo always emphasized, which has particular pertinence and
interest in the light of contemporary views. What I 'have chosen to stress
are not his contributions to freedom of judicial decision, but the limitations
on that freed6m which he continuously asserted. My choice is itself a tribute
to the rapidity with which the climate of juristic thought changes. When
the original lectures were given, interest centered in the last of his four
methods of judicial decision, that of sociology, or, as he stated it, with the
directive force of the process exerted along "the lines of justice, morals and
social welfare, the mores'of the day." 6 That was the exciting npw develop-
ment of those days. Justice Cardozo himself manfully carried this approach
from the cloisters of the classroom into the sanctuary of judicial decision it-
self. Indeed his third lecture was boldly entitled The Judge As A Legislator,
while his fourth even quoted the profanations of Theodore Roosevelt that
"the chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges,
because they are the final seat of authority." I But time moves on; and now
I am at pains to point out not the exuberance of, but rather the restraints
incorporated into, his analysis.
It will be recalled that his other methods were those of philosophy, i.e.,
analogy; of evolution, i.e., historical development; and of tradition, i.e., the
customs of the community. These were not sharply delimited. As Professor
Patterson has so well pointed out, their lines tended to blur and intermingle.
Then, too, the descriptive titles are not altogether helpful; thus one might
4. The adjective is Judge Burch's in his review in 31 YALE L. J. 677 (1922).
5. In his address on Jurisprudence before the New York State Bar Association in
1932, p. 15 of this edition.
6. P. 117 herein; pp. 30, 31, of THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
7. Pp. 179, 180, herein; pp. 170, 171, of THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
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not immediately recognize the analysis of precedents as the method of "phi-
losophy." Nor were the four methods real co-ordinates, resorted to in equal
parts or in strict alternation by the judge. Moreover, although the purpose
is to describe how the judge himself approaches the task of decision, the
analysis is often that of the philosopher describing what has taken place in
the juristic mind. It is obvious, however, that he intended to keep his analy-
sis fluid and tentative; and his last lecture properly stresses the "subcon-
scious element" in the process. I agree with Professor Patterson that "one
can quarrel with Cardozo's terminology and one can be baffled by his diffuse-
ness in detail but one can see in the large what he was trying to get at." 8
Hence over and over we find Cardozo stressing the recurring and humdrum
nature of much of the judge's activities. Only rarely does a truly great case
come along to justify real exercise of the judicial wings. In a later lecture
he goes so far as to say that "nine-tenths, perhaps more, of the cases that
come before a court are predetermined . . . their fate preistablished by
inevitable laws that follow them from birth to death." 0 This figure is
deemed too high by Professor Patterson. But I think the fault is in a bit
of hyperbole in statement and that he was still intending to emphasize the
process of judgment, not the potential result to the individual litigant. In
his first lectures he stated his thought more completely. Here he said that
of the cases in his (appellate) court, "a majority, I think, could not, with
semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. . . . In another and
considerable percentage, the rule of law is certain, and the application
[through a maze of facts] alone doubtful." While these may often "provoke
difference of opinion among judges," "jurisprudence remains untouched,
however, regardless of the outcome." Only in a comparatively small number
of cases does the creative element in the judicial process find its "opportunity
and power," "where a decision one way or the other will count for the future"
or "advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development
of the law." 10
I am quite sure that this in general is a fair picture of the work of appellate
courts and that, if anything, the Justice understates the number of truly
original cases. Of course, a judge by study and thought and by careful
choice of expression may lift a case out of the merely dull and casual run;
but even if he makes it a thing of professional joy or beauty, it is still a law-
yer's guide, rather than an original expression of community mores. Perhaps
it is better so. Otherwise in some of our courts decision would have to be
long postponed while the judges tried to reconcile their views of public policy!
Itwas a quite special constitutional problem which brought forth the Brandeis
brief; whether or not it may again become necessary, its use is not as a divin-
ing rod for the ordinary case. As for the trial court, the proportion of the
8. Patterson, supra note 1, at 165.
9. Pp. 212, 213, herein; p. 60 of THE GRon w1 OF THE LAW.
10. P. 177 herein; pp. 164, 165, of THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
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humdrum is substantially greater. There of course the problem of ascertain-
ing the facts and reconciling them with the assumed principles is more im-
mediately pressing-and perhaps often more exciting. But it does not admit
of more, or even of as much, of the creative element to which Cardozo had
reference.
This leads me to the first of Cardozo's methods and what he has to say
about it. He puts first the rule of analogy, but says that in doing so he does
not rate it as the most important, that, on the contrary, it is often sacrificed
to others, but comes first because it has a certain presumption in its favor.
"Given a mass of particulars, a congeries of judgments on related topics, the
principle that unifies and .rationalizes them has a tendency, and a legitimate
one, to project and extend itself to new cases within the limits of its capacity
to unify and rationalize." " This puts it exactly. True, the revulsion from
the undue worship of precedents in the past was quite sound and desirable.
Indeed even now a judge too often tends to conceal his real decision by mak-
ing an abstraction of a mere rule of procedure or otherwise assuming the
existence of some completely binding authority. Such evasions of individual
judicial responsibility in adjudication may well be condemned and criticized
whenever they appear.' 2 But as a method of adjudication, we still start off, if
indeed we do not end, with a lawyerlike analysis and reconciliation of the
authorities.
Now, after all these years, this may seem like quite an anticlimax. Perhaps
it is; but to avoid being misunderstood, I shall restate just what I have in
mind. I definitely am not saying that these precedents must be examined
because they will lead mechanically or even "inevitakly" to a decision for
one party or another. As we have seen, Cardozo did not mean that; in his
survey there was a considerable group of cases where the judges might dis-
pute as to the actual result. I say only that these other precedents give us
in the main the stuff from which our decisions are wrought. True, there are
a considerable number of cases where analysis-if not manipulation-of the
facts takes the leading role in the process; while in others statutory interpre-
tation, involving modem techniques of balancing bits of legislative history,
holds sway. But even here the thinking of other judges, stimulated by other
lawyers, or by law professors or other text writers in their critical case re-
views, is likely to have a prominent part.
I hope it is clear that I do not urge that this should be the over-all situa-
tion. As a matter of fact, during many years of teaching, I looked for and
thought I observed signs of a broadening of the stuff of decisions. And I
think a lack of means, time, and even of interest has prevented developments
which might have been, or may still be, of great potential value.' 3 I am
11. Note 6 supra.
12. See the discussion of "procedural particularism" in CLARK, HANDBOOK OF Tn
LAW OF CODE PLEADING 69-71 (2d ed. 1947).
13. Thus note that most promising attempt at cultivation of the area common to juris-
prudence and psychology, ROBINSON, LAW AND TnE LAWYERS (1935) passim, and'par-
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merely trying to describe the process as I find it. In my judicial experience,
two reactions are more vivid than the rest. One is the willingness of so many
counsel to go before the courts, even appellate courts, with so little prepara-
tion and so great trust in the judges to do what we have been led by precept
to regard as the prime task of the lawyers. And the other is how, for all of
us on the bench, whatever our prior background-professorial or professional
alike-a case, however drab, takes on life in the light of what other courts
have thought about the same or similar problems. However it may be in the
juridical millenium, at the present time the study of precedents, far from
making justice mechanical, gives it what breadth, depth, and sophistication
of approach it now has. As proof I suggest a comparison of a case where a
judge talks only in terms of his own more or less vague concepts of justice
in the abstract, and one where the result is reached only after a careful survey
of the prevalent thinking, legal and nonlegal, so far as he can find it, upon
the matters in issue.
All this is hardly new. I stress it only for the purpose of pointing a moral
or two. One might concern the preparation of trials and appeals by counsel;
but perhaps a judge should not venture into fields so much the prerogative
of the bar. Moreover, some experience leads me to doubt the value of judi-
cial admonition in the premises. But I am bold enough to venture some sug-
gestions involving the law schools and legal education in general.
First is the conclusion that the job of the schools, in the climate of actual
professional activity, is being done much better than the present chorus of
criticism would indicate. It remains true that the best work in the trial and
appellate courts comes from the product of the modern law school. Much
is made of the lack of experience of these men, the failure of the schools to
attempt more legal clinics, their neglect to bring their students into the
courts-in short their lack of attention or even due reverence to the journey-
men's tricks of the trade. Such suggestions, urged as practical, seem to me
in the highest degree impractical; as has been well said, we should need to
enter our sons at five years of age in a reorganization course to watch a
complete proceeding! I believe that any judge would say from experience
that a client's fate is safer with a youngster who has successfully surmounted
the severe testing of the good schools than an oldster whose experience has
taught him little beyond the obvious. Naturally better than either is the
lawyer who combines capacity and training with experience. That combina-
ticularly at c. 14, unfortunately cut short by the death of its stimulating author. Among a
wealth of fruitful suggestions compare this, p. 168: "There needs to be added to the play
of ideas the play of personality upon personality, of judge upon judge. The psychological
principles of leadership, of jealousy, of positive and negative suggestibility must ultimately
be taken into account if we are to gain an adequate understanding of the judicial process:'
This statement also carried this interesting footnote: "Even such a liberal as Professor
Felix Frankfurter may-draw back timidly before the thought that tact, good humor, ca-
snaraderie may be a potent force within the celestial chamber of the court. See FnrAm-
FuRaa, Ma. Jus"icE HOL~sE, 1931, at 46."
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tion, however, tends to be found less and less in the courtroom as our econ-
omy has developed. I had the explanation recently when I asked one able
former student why he did not appear more frequently in our court. His
answer was, "To tell the truth, I can't afford it. My time is too valuable in
my office to waste it in going before you fellows." Alas that the richest re-
wards of our profession are not to be achieved in the courtroom; but wher-
ever they are, even occasionally in public life, there will be found, successful
and competent, the man who has gone through this supposedly esoteric
training.
But a succeeding thought is that that very success carries its own responsi-
bilities and incentives for increased effort for the schools. It is obvious that
if judges and lawyers are ever to get out of their respective ruts, it is the law
schools which will provide the inspiration and the motive power. Beyond
the fertilizing force of the views of other courts, which I have referred to
above, is the stimulus of the legal texts and reviews, now increasingly rec-
ognized in the opinions. It is not long before some new view by a law teacher
finds lodgment in an opinion; and not unusually a whole current of legal
authority is reversed upon the persuasion of a single law review article.
Further, the law I am discussing, and which was Cardozo's immediate in-
terest, is judge's law. That in all likelihood will occupy less and less of the
law teacher's field. Other processes, legislative, administrative, those of
world assemblies and courts, are more and more within his province. Let us
have more of soul-searchings by the professors; while their accomplishments
are greater than they now appear to believe, their intellectual qualms and
strivings will sooner or later-enrich the judicial process. So I can do no better
than emulate Cardozo in his plaudits for the schools. For he was among the
first in his decisions to show a complete awareness of the impact of scholarly
thinking upon the problems which came before his court. And his lectures
explicitly and implicitly bear tribute to the persuasive and pervasive force
of the writing emanating from the law schools. It is small wonder that he
became almost at once the darling of the schools, which urged his appoint-
ment to the highest court a full decade before the event actually occurredl
Of course no reference, however fleeting, to Cardozo's writings can prop-
erly be made without mention of the beauty and force of his prose style. Had
he not been able to express himself in "glowing, sententious prose," to use
Professor Patterson's apt expression, much of the force of his message would
have been lost. I need not attempt to gild the lily, but I will refer to one
attribute which I have seen little mentioned, his touches of delicate wit and
humor, so unlike a judge. This often appeared in his many expressions of
modest self-depreciation. Thus at the close of one address he says, "Like
Socrates and other bores, I have earned the draft of hemlock if you choose
to pass the cup." 14 On another occasion, when he had been chosen for the




at that particular stage of his life's journey he should have been selected
and thought of the explanation given by Lord Salisbury, as English premier,
for appointing Mr. Alfred Austin poet laureate in succession to Lord Tenny-
son: "I don't think anybody else applied for the post." Then he went on
to disclaim even that modicum of fitness shown by Mr. Austin.13 At times
this could be coupled with a fine sense of irony. What more complete demo-
lition of a majority outburst likening "with denunciatory fervor" an SEC
investigation to the Star Chamber of the Stuarts could be found than his
classic response, "Historians may find hyperbole in the sanguinary simile." ,
One more suggestion and I am done. A standard criticism of modem
realists is their supposed repudiation of all moral values and their refusal
to acknowledge the force of ethical principles and the higher law. We need
not stop here to comment upon the interesting dialectical inversion whereby
a movement most prominently identified with warmhearted support of wel-
fare legislation, i.e., increased aid and sustenance for the poor and the unfor-
tunate, should be found thus wanting in moral qualities. We may note,
however, that at least as to Cardozo, who both "preached" and "practiced"
the same doctrine "in a modest way," 17 this charge cannot be maintained.
For he continuously stressed, in his opinions and in his lectures, the shaping
force of the moral values of life." His addresses contain some of the most
felicitous expression of a lofty morality to be found in any professional writ-
ing. The first address of this book, entitled Values, or The Cioice of Tychio
Brahe, tells poetically of a scholar's choice of service and sacrifice in place
of fame and position.' I need not stress this; all who had the rare privilege
of knowing him attested to his high sense of devotion and dedication. His
sincerity was patent. An impulse to quote is here strong; I shall' limit my-
self to a single one. This was his reaction to the "fitness and beauty and
impressiveness" of the grand jurors' oath going back to the day of the Saxon
kings: "Like the tones of a mighty bell, these echoing notes of adjuration
bring back our straying thoughts to sanctity and service. I cannot listen
to them without a thrill. Here .. . imperishably preserved amid the grime
and dust of centuries, the word has been proclaimed, to steady us when we
15. P. 99.
16. Jones v. Securities Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 33 (1936).
17. Cardozo, op. cit. supra note 5, at 13.
18. Thus see his fourth and fifth lectures--"The Function and the Ends of Law"-
in THE GRonWH OF THE LAW, and several of his lectures in THE PAanoxEs OF LEGAL
SciNcF, viz., "The Meaning of Justice-The Science of Values," "The Individual and
Society," "Liberty and Government," also discussion by Professor Patterson, supra note
1. For his judicial decisions, see the careful analyses by various writers in the memorial
number of the Columbia and Harvard Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal cited note
3 mtpra; and see also SHiENTAG, MouLDERS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 1-93 (1943); L v,
CAIMozo AND FRoNIERs OF LEGAL TH xxG (1938).
19. This, the Commencement Address at the Jewish Institute of Religion (1931), we
are told, was requested by hundreds of men in the Armed Forces during World War II.
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seem to falter, to strengthen us when we seem to weaken, to tell us that
with all the failings and backslidings, with all the fears and all the prejudice,
the spirit is still pure." 20
CiARLEs E. CLARK t
PATTERNS OF UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS. By Frederick H. Harbison
and Robert Dubin. Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1947. Pp. 221.
$3.75.
THE recent growth of centers devoted to research in labor relations should
be viewed as a Good Thing: the alluring prospect of an integrated social
science glows, like the Grail, ahead.' Anthropologists, economists, psycholo-
gists and sociologists have gathered together to gain knowledge of the inter-
action of human beings and human institutions within an industrial frame-
work. And their quest is worthy: they examine a segment of society whose
daily decisions affect the whole community; they explore an enduring rela-
tion which exists no matter in whose hands the ownership of tools.
Their program entails an initial act of faith. Like all who seek a science
of society, they must assume that they deal with material composed of a
finite number of variables, that the human mind is capable of manipulating
an enormous, reticulated set of factors, that adequate machinery for un-
earthing knowledge of those factors exists, and that the content of each
factor remains fairly stable during the awesomely lengthy and tedious accre-
tion of knowledge. These are large assumptions and their adoption cows
more than the craven. But refusal to adopt them means giving up the battle
-and, indeed, real proof of their invalidity can come only after the assump-
tions are made and the adventure attempted.
2
The search itself raises the further problem of selectivity: faced with the
close-knit fabric of going institutions one must decide what to study. Here
20. Address to the graduating class of St. John's University Law School in 1928, Our
Lady of the Common Law, 13 ST. Joux's L. REv. 231 (1939) ; p. 95 herein.
' Circuit Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
1. And more than prospective is the immediate practical value derived from forums
in which labor and management leaders can gain understanding of the others' viewpoint.
2. The live practical issue is how verifiable social data is to be gathered with a mini-
mum expenditure of time and personnel. To date we seem to have progressed little fur-
ther than the questionnaire and the interview: the data presented is doubly subjective,
being conditioned by its sources as well as by the investigator. And formation of a theory
correlating subjective reaction with pure phenomena seems futile, for it cannot be validated
until the phenomena can be observed. It is, therefore, in the field of techniques that de-
velopments must come. Until then, the social scientist works with feeble tools which may
perhaps be barely efficient in terms of time expenditure but which raise doubts as to the
assumption of "adequate machinery"; and until then an unverifiable" assumption of objec-
tive-subjective correlation must be made.
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subjective judgment limits the field of inquiry and to that extent, predeter-
mines results; but there is consolation in that the reasoned hunch of irrele-
vancy is a part of the touchstone-natural science; and, in any event, the
prudent investigator expands his scope to err on the side of caution. More-
over, the danger is lessened by concurrent studies, each deriving from differ-
ent hunches and each, therefore, contributing otherwise omitted facts to the
conglomerate.
Professors Harbison and Dubin, ranking officers of the Industrial Rela-
tions Center of the University of Chicago, chose to examine labor relations
in the General Motors and Studebaker corporations and have published
their findings as "only a modest first step" "to a more precise understanding
of the nature and consequences of labor relations throughout the country as
a whole and in the mass production industries in particular." 3
The authors' modesty is not unduly self-deprecatory.
The information gathered is a disappointment, both as to breadth and
type. True, the scope of inquiry is at bottom a matter of hunch. But it is
still shocking to find, without reasoned explanation, complete lack of data
about individual worker satisfactions, and only offhand reference 4 to the
economics of the firm and the sociology of the firm's workers and managers. 5
And the lack of range is not the result of a decision to cultivate intensively;
the authors have put high gloss on a balloon. Where institutional analysis
of management and union is looked for, one finds a description of skeletal
structure; where dissection of key personalities is sought, one finds quota-
tions from speeches; where a mutually reactive relation is to be examined,
one finds intuitive conclusions. The data presented is all too much like that
found in a magazine article based on industrious use of newspaper files. And,
as a result, little durable information is added to the stockpile. Professor
Harbison has elsewhere said: "there is a great need for casestudies of differ-
ent types of labor-management relationships in which the principal social,
psychological, political, and economic factors which determine each individ-
ual relationship are carefully analyzed." 6 The need exists unabated.
For lagniappe, the authors have also provided a set of conclusions, the
chief of which is that labor relations in a "power center" 7 like General Mo-
tors are likely to be less healthy than in a small "pattern-following" firm
like Studebaker. This may or may not be true: but it can hardly be logically
derived from a study restricting itself to one of each type. And there is in-
3. P. 12.
4. Here Prof. Dubin's Studebaker study does not sin so much as his colleague's ex-
amination of General Motors.
5. Matters, for instance, like community composition and the role of management and'
union, sources and media of community opinion, income levels, incidence of unemployment,
accidents, old age, etc.
6. 37 Amt. Ecox. REv. (Supp.) 375, 382 (1947).
7. A firm which through size and custom molds working conditions for the entire
industry.
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consistency in the authors' reasoning: their thesis is that the pattern-fol-
lowers have a much easier task of adjustment because major economic issues
are for them already decided; 8 yet they state that the "fundamental con-
flict" in General Motors is not over economic issues, but rather the "sharply
differing concepts and beliefs on what collective bargaining should include.
i . .I 9 They generalize further that (apparently whether pattern-followers
or not) in "mass production industries constructive relationships are likely
to be most common in medium-sized and small concerns." 10 Against this,
one may put the statement of two acute steelworker leaders: "We have
weighed our experiences with small firms as against big ones to see if there
are any basic differences. Our conclusion is that there are not.""1 Again
here the authors may be right, but they are gainsaying experience with in-
tuition, not proof.
The lesson is that meticulous fact-gathering cannot be supplanted by an
inadequately selected and explored sample used to prove an a priori theory.1
The danger is that other research centers may emulate in the rush to publish.
And the pity is that two capable men have wasted precious time.
ARTHUR MERMIN t
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. By C. Perry Patterson.
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1947. Pp. 301.
As THE half way point in the twentieth century draws near, the United
States draws farther and farther away from the kind of nation which existed
during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. It is vastly different
in boundary and area, in economy and social organization, in mores and
morality. And it has a vastly different Constitution. The political and legal
history of the nation has been marked by a constant process of readjustment
in governmental organization. The old theories remain, but their manifesta-
tion in practice bears little resemblance to what went on when the Founding
Fathers started the great experiment. A new age with its new problems
has brought forth a new government.
8. "Outside the power centers company and union bargain with each other within
the limits of economic patterns .... For this reason constructive union-management rela-
tions are likely to be found in small or medium sized companies." P. 211.
9. P. 98.
10. P. 220.
11. GOLDEN AND RuTTENBERG, THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL DEMocRAcY 82 n.1
(1942).
12. This is not to suggest that "facts" per se have any worth or can even be gathered
without some sort of working hypothesis. On this issue, the quarrel with the authors, in
addition to their failure to "prove" their theory, is that they involve themselves in a pure
value hypothesis-"constructive union-management relations"-at a time when an ade-
quate theory of how and why men and institutions behave is still lacking.
t Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School; member of the Connecticut Bar.
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Of the writing of books about this phenomenon, there appears to be no
end.
One of the latest is an odd combination of erudite scholarship, wise-cracks,
overstatement, startling generalization, dogmatism, naivet6 and sophis-
tication by an experienced teacher who is concerned about the relationship
of the American presidency to the Congress and, to a lesser degree, of the
Supreme Court to both the Congress and the presidency.
The author appears to take an almost childish delight in exaggeration.
For example, in commenting on the New Deal Court: "Dual Federalism
was abolished. The states were truly conquered provinces. Separation of
powers was obsolete. . . The positive theory of the state had been ac-
cepted. Whether it would be fascism or communism or a mixture of both
with a little individualism merely tolerated . . . was no longer a judicial
question but theoretically a congressional and actually a presidential matter.
The President was now over the Congress, over the bureaucracy, and over
the judiciary." 1 Again, the assertion that Justice Holmes believed "that
the Constitution was not a limitation upon the court." 2 And further:
"For more than 150 years the Supreme Court has been trying to discover
what the Constitution means, and according to its own records it has made
a dismal failure." ' Still again: "The President then as a political executive
may not only renominate and continue himself in office, but in the role of a
prime minister he may propose the measures involved in his legislative policy
and force them into law." 4
The author's fondness for the categorical superlative is also much in evi-
dence, as witness: "Uncle Joe Cannon . . . the most powerful speaker the
country ever had." 5 "Woodrow Wilson was the most severe critic of con-
gressional government that the country has produced." 0 "This [period of
great political influence of the Speaker, 1869-1911] was the nearest approach
to the development of responsibility in government within the Congress
that is found in our history." 7 "This historical tendency [increasing powers
of the president] has been the most revolutionary and destructive process
known to political organization." 8 "There has never been a President who
more completely controlled the Congress than Jefferson." 9 "This develop-
ment [growth of administrative agencies] has created the most serious prob-
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change that has been made in the American system since its establishment
has been the growth of the powers of the national executive." 11
As might be suspected from these random quotations, the author is worried
about what he regards as the breakdown of the system of checks and bal-
ances, the development of presidential supremacy and the consequent gov-
ernment by a man instead of the law. As Wilson observed, the Constitution
is not a mere lawyer's document; it is the vehicle of a nation's life. The au-
thor thinks that if the Constitution is not a lawyer's document, then it has
ceased to be a fundamental law. This appears to be a logical deduction if
we assume the orthodox distinction between law and politics; and such a
distinction is one of the inarticulate major premises of Professor Patterson's
book. He believes that the Constitution has a meaning. When the Supreme
Court reverses a prior decision, it indicates that it does not know what the
Constitution means or that it thinks the document can "mean anything
or nothing." 12 So too, the niceties of judicial "distinctions," the manipula-
tion of the various social and economic criteria in arriving at judgments and,
indeed, most of the techniques which characterize the judicial process in our
public law are all regarded as aspects of "the tragic side of the history of the
court." 13 The heart of the "tragedy," of course, is that the Court has scut-
tled the Constitution by abdicating the power over Congress which Marshall
won for it. This is largely the result of the president's political influence over
the Court through the power of appointment. The president, through pat-
ronage, his control over the bureaucracy, and his role as political executive
has gained control over the Congress. He is thus supreme and our govern-
ment finds itself following the world trend. "Executive supremacy in fact
and in process is now the chief characteristic of modern governments whether
totalitarian or traditionally democratic." H4
Although recognizing the basic causes of this phenomenon in the expand-
ing functions of the modern state, the enormous growth of administrative
agencies, the change from laissez-faire to a planned economy and the emer-
gence of the United States as a world leader in international affairs, Professor
Patterson regards it as "unthinkable that this great nation should trust its
fate to an untrained bureaucracy whose legal existence rests upon presiden-
tial decrees and whose discretion is subject to the power of absolute dismissal
by the President." 15
For all Professor Patterson's florid journalism, viewing these tendencies
with alarm and occasional distortion, he is dealing with a fundamental prob-
lem with insight. "The history of tyranny," as he says 11 "is primarily a









of legislative and judicial agencies. ... *" It is also true that "the relation
between the executive and legislative cries to heaven for readjustment." 17
Although it might be argued that the American presidency suffers from too
little rather than too great power, the truth appears to be that a par-
ticular president can be about as strong as his leadership warrants or as
impotent as it permits. The rule has been the mediocre or weak chief execu-
tive who accepted the limitations of the office. The strong, when the oc-
casion required, usually found a way.
But it is in the role of political rather than administrative executive that
the office of president has been the controlling factor in the destiny of the
nation under a strong incumbent. The relative irresponsibility of the presi-
dent in this role is the source of danger. Professor Patterson's proposed
solution is a modified cabinet form of government in which a cabinet com-
posed of members of Congress would take over the functions of political
executive, leaving to the presidency the "constitutional" function of ad-
ministrative head of the Government. As to just how this would work, the
author is inconveniently vague. He thinks the advantages of the system,
among others, would include the unification of legislative policy and the
administration of foreign affairs as well as effective supervision over the
administrative divisions of the government. Nevertheless, we are assured
that the "proposal would not endanger the President's powers. . . .There
is not the slightest possibility as long as the President is popularly elected
that he would become the figurehead that the English king is. . . ." 13
We are told that the president's veto power would still be available. The
author admits, however, that it would rarely be used for the obvious rea-
son that, ordinarily, to exercise the power would be tantamount to the
president's joining the opposition. Where the Congress is controlled by
the party opposed to the president, of course, he is already in the opposi-
tion, and where one House of Congress is controlled by one party, the other
House by the opposition, the resulting "coalition" cabinet would obviously
make a veto a futile gesture.'9 It is, therefore, not apparent that the presi-
dency would not become a figure-head in the hands of a weak man.
On the other hand, it is by no means clear that the proposal, which the
author himself describes as "only a change in legislative procedure," would
effectively curb the powers of a strong president. One may suspect that the
existence of such legislative machinery in 1933 would in no way have affected
the vigor of Roosevelt's leadership or the extent to which he would have
used his office to secure the adoption of his policies. It may be suggested,
therefore, that the author's scheme would probably leave the situation very
much as it is now and that the presidency would continue as a vehicle for a
weak president to let Congress run the country or a strong president to run
17. P. 239.
18. P. 271.
19. This is recognized by the author who concedes that the veto would tend to become
another "constitutional fiction like the electoral college." See p. 264.
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it himself. This does not mean that, through closer relationship, joint policy
consideration between the executive and legislative branches of the govern-
ment would not result in a more unified legislative program and a reduction
of friction between the two branches.2
Other questions may be raised. Supervision of administration by Congress
beyond that now exercised by the appropriations committees is probably
something that will not and should not be realized. There is no reason to
suppose that a representative, merely because he has been elected repeatedly
from a single Congressional district and thus has obtained the needed senior-
ity to become a conmittee chairman and cabinet officer," would be a more
competent or responsible supervisor then a department head selected by a
popularly elected president. Supervision by Congress might be one thing,
but supervision by a single member of the congressional bureaucracy is quite
another and it is the latter that we would surely get under the modified
cabinet system proposed.
Because a proposed remedy may be inadequate does not mean that one
is not needed. The increasingly complex problems of government under the
impact, first of the great depression and, then, of the great war, throw the
spotlight on the deficiencies of our scheme of government. The rash of dis-
cussion and proposed solutions over the past decade bears witness to the
importance of improving the machinery for policy unification and effective
administration. 2 The organization and control of the bureaucracy, the prob-
lem of personnel and the relationship of the president to the Congress present
problems which will require the making of many proposals before workable
ones are found. Presidential Government in the United States makes a stimu-
lating, if sometimes irritating contribution to this process.
FOWLER HARPER t
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Paul R. Hays. Brooklyn:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1947. Pp. 1058. $8.00.
PROCEDURE courses, with the exception of evidence, seem like Alice to be
in some danger of hitting their chins on their feet. Curriculum pressures
from new areas clamoring for recognition or from old areas grown bigger
have developed a tendency to crowd procedure into dwarfish proportions.
Symptomatic is the rash of one-volume collections of cases and materials
20. Cf. the suggestion for a Joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet in FiNLEr ri, CAN
REPRESENTATnE GovERMENT Do TnE JOB? (1945).
21. See pp. 267-8.
22. To mention but a few, in addition to the book under review : LAsKI, THE Amaz-
cAx PEism-ncy 1940; HAzLiTT, A NAv CoxsTiurioN Now (1942); FINLMEM, CAN
REPRESENTATrr GovERNMENT Do THE: JoB? (1945); FLYNN, MEET YouR CONGREss
(1944).
t Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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designed to guide the wayfarer from the time he enters the litigation forest
with a summons until he emerges at the other side on appeal, omitting the
admission and exclusion of evidence.
Since Professor Hays has not included by way of introduction any explan-
ation of his omissions and inclusions, this reviewer is forced to draw from
the general plan and scheme of the book his own conclusions as to the views
of the editor which find expression. Among those which I draw are the fol-
lowing: 1. The case method of instruction is wasteful and ineffective. 2.
Pleading has become unimportant. 3. Jurisdiction should not be handled as
a procedural problem.
1. The case mettod of instruction. The designation "cases and materials"
is an accurate one, as the book consists roughly one-half of cases and one-half
of such other materials as rules, statutes, reports of advisory committees,
law review articles, and some original writing by the editor. In the 1058
pages of the book approximately 160 cases appear, as compared for example
with Clark's Cases on .Pleading and Procedure which in 60 fewer pages con-
tains about 50 per cent more cases. Undoubtedly non-case materials in a
sense afford more compact and economical coverage of subject matter, but
the question arises whether such massive doses are effective. Despite Judge
Frank's characterization of Langdell as a neurotic bookworm, the case
method of instruction has represented a substantial advance over previous
systems which dealt out learning in large and undigestible masses. Presum-
ably all are by now agreed that what is to be taught is the solution of legal
problems, rather than "the law", and legal problems do not exist without
factual settings. By supplying some of this essential background, the case
method as a teaching system has made it possible to discuss problems rather
than abstractions. True, the facts supplied are somewhat desiccated and by
the winnowing process of appellate court opinion writing are removed at
least one step from the reality of the trial court, but in any event they are
facts of a sort. The stage is set for the particular problem dealt with in the
case, and a convenient basis is furnished for those further "supposes" which
seem to be essential to good classroom discussion.2 Wasteful this may be,
but perhaps comparable to the temporary scaffold which surrounds a build-
ing under construction.
For the same reasons which lead courts to abhor advisory opinions, the
editor presumably does not intend to allow classroom discussions of the
1. Frank, A Plea for Lauyer-Schools, 56 YAI L. J. 1303 (1947).
2. Id. at 1313. Judge Frank says this is like training horticulturists through the
study of cut flowers, but I believe that is some improvement over merely telling them
about cut flowers. The Judge is a popularizer in reverse,-his specialty is in making easy
things look difficult. With his customary knack of devoting many pages to demolishing
arguments which no one advances anyway, the Judge concludes that contemporary legal
training is too far removed from the realities of the law office and the court room. This
conclusion will astonish no one. He advocates a closer acquaintance with the facts of life,
but I am unable to find in his verbal shrubbery any suggestion more concrete than the pro-
posal of an occasional chaperoned tour through the bordellos of the law, viz., court rooms
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non-case materials to proceed on too abstract a plane. The doubt in my mind
is whether the discussion of such materials can proceed on any plane at all,
unless placed before students as problems in some manner. While the editor
leaves unanswered the question of how the materials are to be utilized, it
seems apparent that problems to be solved in terms of the materials would
have to be assigned in advance. I doubt the adequacy of the non-case ma-
terials for this excellent method. After all, texts and articles are based pri-
marily on reported cases, whether "right" ones or "wrong" ones, and a
somewhat more realistic approach is to send the students back to the sources,
which is where they will go in practice. The valuable materials which Pro-
fessor Hays has included supplement, rather than supplant, the cases. They
deserve preservation and accessibility to students beyond the confines of
the reviews and suggest the desirability of a selection of readingo in proccdure
akin to those which have been published in other fields.3 If this view of the
case method of teaching seems conservative, then it is meant to be so in the
sense of conserving what has proved to be of value in the past and has not
yet been demonstrated to be without value for the present.
2. The unimportance of pleading. Nowhere in the book is the editor's
platform of economy more apparent than in the portions on pleading, where
59 pages deal with complaints, 22 with defensive pleadings, and 24 with
amendments, a total of 105 pages. By way of contrast, 107 pages are de-
voted to res judicata. If with pleading we consider, as properly should be
done, the related procedures for discovery, pretrial and summary judgment,
134 more pages are added, bringing the total to 239. The cases number 27,
including Hickman v. Taylor in both the Circuit Court of Appeals 4 and the
Supreme Court of the United States.'
This brief treatment accorded pleading is, 'in my opinion, unfortunate.
The relationship between substantive and adjective law is demonstrated
more effectively by pleading than by any other subject with the possible
exception of jury instructions. The student's first assignment in drafting
a pleading reveals substantive rules in a new and different light. He is con-
fronted with the realities, or something closely akin to them, of bringing to
life the things in the" books. He begins to acquire some appreciation of how
a lawyer approaches a problem.
and law offices. He must concede that law is a body of knowledge of sorts and should be
approached with some more orderly plan of attack than is apparent in mere observation of
what a judge or lawyer fortuitously chances to be engaged upon at the moment. For a
man so prolific in literary output that he is able to push Bartlett to one side and quote
only from himself, the Judge demonstrates an amazing distrust of what is in books. My
own observation is that the reaction of the beginning lawyer is one of surprise at how
intellectual an occupation practicing law really is.
3. HARvARD LAW REIvEw Ass'Nr, SEaCTED ESSAYS OF THE LAW Or ToRTs (1924);
Ass'x OF 'AmERIcAN LAw SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGs ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1931); Ass'x oF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1938).
4. 153 F2d 212 (C.C.A. 3d 1945).
5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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In some quarters it has become the fashion to depreciate the utility of
pleadings as a practical administrative instrument. Regardless of the merits
of that argument, the hard fact remains *that pleadings still constitute the
framework of reference for the admission of evidence, the instruction of
juries, the return of verdicts, and the entry of judgments and decrees. A
carefully prepared set of pleadings is the cornerstone of a carefully tried
case. The stagnant technicalities which developed in common-law pleading
and the dilatory practices which are still possible under more modem systems
have left a bad taste, but they are highly instructive. Are we to conclude
that bad things are not to be studied? The elimination of pleading as a law
school subject means the discarding of the central core of several hundred
years of administrative experience. In Stringfellow Barr's phrase, we are
omitting the minutes of the previous meeting. I would not hold the meeting
over again, but that does not preclude a reasonable acquaintance with the
business which was transacted. Any other course means merely the train-
ing of more rut-followers, and the fact that the ruts may be new ones laid
out by the federal rules, which are emphasized throughout the book, makes
them none the less ruts. Evaluation without perspective becomes impossible.
A student trained from this book would, for example, be unlikely to detect
in federal rule 12(g) a tendency to return to the common-law hierarchy of
defensive pleadings and the junking of a hundred years' effort to eliminate
purely technical distinctions between pleas in abatement and pleas in bar.
Very much on the credit side of the ledger is the generous amount of space
devoted to discovery, pretrial and summary judgment practice. These valu-
able tools of the practitioner have too commonly received casual treatment
or none at all. Professor Hays has provided a useful approach to the avail-
able methods of cutting through the dead wood which may accumulate at
the pleading level of litigation.
3. Jurisdiction not a procedural problem. In one of the few direct hints
dropped as to his plan of organization, Professor Hays states that jurisdic-
tion is dealt with more fully in the course on conflicts and "no attempt is
made to cover it here." 6 This has the advantage of shortening the book.
It seems to overlook, however, the point that for every question of jurisdic-
tion raised in a conflicts background at least a hundred arise in a domestic
setting. Lacking the counterpoint of jurisdiction, venue becomes a mere
problem of geography, and the troublesome and recurring necessity of dis-
tinguishing what is venue and what is jurisdictional disappears.
In like manner jurisdiction of the person becomes the more or less mechan-
ical problem of "Service of Summons" and tends to reduce itself to the ques-
tion of whether the defendant should be able to set the courts at nought by
hiding behind the cow-shed when he sees the sheriff turn into the driveway.
Pennoyer v. Neff 7 and all its important and interesting grandchildren are
6. P.1.
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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substantially forgotten. Similarly lost from view is the problem of basing
jurisdiction of a foreign corporation upon the test whether it is present in the
state.
Whether Professor Hays chopped the body to bits because his colleagues
made him do it, or whether he acted of his own free will, we do not know. In
either event, disagreement with certain of his basic assumptions does not
preclude appreciation of the able performance represented by the book. The
suggestion of new attacks on old problems, the posing of new problems,.and
the challenge to conventional teaching methods are refreshing and possess
vitality. Yet the conviction remains that lawyers must be skilled in setting
the judicial machine in motion and in exerting a measure of control over
the route it follows, and the desired objective cannot be gained by relegating
procedure to secondary rank.
EDWARD W. CLEARY t
MAX WEBER: THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOIIC ORGANIZATION.
Translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1947. Pp. x, 436. $6.00.
MAX WEBER'S Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft is a fragmentary, incomplete,
yet nevertheless magnificently informed and penetrating study of the socio-
logical and institutional foundations of modern society. The first part of
that work is its methodological introduction, which contains, so far as he
stated it systematically at all, the theoretic basis upon which Weber's com-
prehensive verstehende Soziologie was erected. But it is, at the same time,
the introduction to his enormously ambitious attempt to understand the
social structure and dynamics of Western society, and as such, theoretical
analysis is throughout conditioned.and illumined by application to the broad
empirical problems of historical structure and change in which he was par-
ticularly absorbed. These first pages of his extraordinary book, therefore,
reflect to a degree not easily matched in any other single work, a fusion of
Weber's two major scientific interests, the one dominant, the other instru-
mental, nor does either appear to better general advantage elsewhere. It
is this section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft that Talcott Parsons, whose
name has been connected with Weber studies for twenty years and more,
now has added to the growing corputs of Weber's writings in English. Though
there are misplaced emphases and an occasional misunderstanding, the trans-
lation is as faithful as is possible in the case of a work abounding in compli-
cated and technically difficult phrasing, but certainly all minor blemishes
in form are more 'than overshadowed by the acute and felicitous selection
of subject matter. No better'conception of Weber's systematic treatment
of the complex and baffling problems he set himself to solve can be gained
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
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from any other of his works available in English. Indeed, it would be diffi-
cult to choose among his writings taken as a whole another that within equal
compass supplies so admirable a view. Without doubt, Professor Parsons,
who also contributes a valuable introduction, has placed English-speaking
scholarship deeply in his debt.
Capitalism, in the sense in which Weber meant it, must be regarded not
as a form of economic organization alone, but as the total unique pattern
assumed by Western society. This, examined at any particular moment, is
not merely an inevitable stage in the evolutionary life-cycle of a civilization,
but a development in every fundamental respect explainable by specific
combinations of circumstances. For Weber, social structures are inherently
unstable and the maintenance of a given state always precarious. Specific
tensions and strains tend to transform in the direction of new or recurrent
structural types, with accompanying far-reaching social and cultural con-
sequences. Thus, the long movement toward the breakdown of tradition-
alized, particularistic, privileged groups, and toward the treatment of social
class by birth and other privileged statuses as irrelevant to status in the
system of authority, valuable as these may be in other respects, lead un-
avoidably to a relatively levelled, undifferentiated mass upon which political
support is based. The democratic principle of appeal to such an electorate,
rather than to one composed of groups with fixed and differentiated status,
opens the way to the emergence of a leader with wide personal appeal, often
at a necessarily low level. The demagogic party leader, once he has become
genuinely charismatic, can readily become a dictator, with a consequent
fundamental transformation in the character of the authority system. In
such circumstances, Weber remarked, the plebiscite or direct appeal comes
readily to hand as a major symbol of democratic legitimation, and would
tend to be effective regardless of its actual genuineness as an expression of
the popular will. Though Weber died when Hitler was no more than a re-
cently demobilized and dissatisfied corporal, he clearly saw that a large-scale
charismatic movement in reaction against modem liberal institutions, but
with certain democratic elements, was a very real possibility, and he went
far to predict the political pattern the Nazi movement in fact took.
But it would be entirely out of character to regard Weber as a prophet of
the future. No one realized better than he the futility of predicting detailed
events long in advance. His object, rather, was to lay bare the distinctive
features of our economy through comparative perspective and then to ana-
lyze the balance of forces and the inherent transformational impulses con-
ducive to alteration in structure. It is in this sphere that he excels and here
that his insights are most profound. Lawyers, particularly, will be interested
in his analysis of the pattern of impersonal, rational-legal authority, one of
the fundamental characteristics of modem society. The principal freedoms
which we have come to value so highly and the relative immunity from dis-
crimination on such grounds as birth or ethnic or class status are dependent
upon it. Though not yet completely realized in practice, the particular status
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and quality of an individual are in theory irrelevant for the purpose of judica-
ture, just as they are, in another context, for appointment to bureaucratic
office, where technical compefence tends to be cqntrolling. Rationalized ab-
straction of part of the human individual from the concrete whole has made
particularistic discrimination less prominent in our society and tends to lead
to the elimination of compulsory traditional status in the interests of a high
degree of social mobility on the basis of ability. But the progressive eman-
cipation of the individual from the dependence of every act and interest on
his total status, a process by no means limited to the examples cited, is based
upon what is, in a sense, an unreal abstraction and a purely rational con-
struct, to be maintained only by continual discipline. Weber indicates its
relative instability and its tendency to break down, either directly or through
the intermediate influence of a large-scale charismatic movement, into a less
abstract and rationalized treatment of the individual as multisided and
complete-in total status form. Its transformation is aided, under such cir-
cumstances, by strains inherent in the structure itself which protects by
rational-legal norms, completely and impersonally, individuals whose qual-
ities and status may not in fact be irrelevant to the continuance of the
institution.
Weber's comprehensive attempt to grasp the dynamic elements of a great
civilization, the appearance of these in many diverse institutions, their in-
stabilities and tendencies to change, is unique in the history of social studies.
His work remains incomplete, perhaps necessarily so, but the reader will
find no dogmatic over-simplification of the immense complexity of the prob-,
lems involved nor can he fail to come away with a heightened understanding
of the interdependent institutions of modern society.
S. E. THORNE t
THE PROCESS AND ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PLANNING. By John D.
Millet. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. Pp. 187. $2.50.
PROFESSOR MiLLET has given us a valuable book, based upon his experi-
ences in government planning and on relevant literature, and marked by
careful and lively thought concerning terms, organization, procedure and
personalities. Like the earlier book by Robert A. Walker I it should be re-
quired reading for all serious students of administration; both books speak
well for the scholarship of the younger generation of students of public ad-
ministration who are evaluating the immense and confusing experience of
government in the last forty years.
The argument is focussed upon a definition of planning as an operational
process. The author rightly believes that carelessness and ambiguity in the
t Associate Professor of Law and Librarian, Yale Law School.
1. THE PLANNING FuNcrIoN IN URBAN GOVERNMENT (1941).
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use of the word "planning" has been and is costly and dangerous because of
the increase of important functions placed upon government and the result-
ing necessity for the best possible execution of the policies adopted to ad-
minister them. While the content is largely limited to the national govern-
ment of the United States, the principles set forth-like the similar ones of
Walker for urban government-have application to government generally.
The author has had the courage to indicate the influence of personalities in
the determination of the scope, methods and results of activities labelled
"planning", and to state (without straining to be "smart") his views of the
proper scope, organization and procedure. He does this by first distinguish-
ing policy from planning whereby operations to carry out policy can be more
wisely prepared and guided.
There follow chapters entitled "Who Plans" and "Central Planning" in
which the staff nature of planning is emphasized-within the framework of
operations and subject to the authority of those with power of decision. The
dangers of using the planning process for "Selling the Plans" are discussed
in the chapter of that title. In the chapter "Organization for Central Plan-
ning"' Millet discusses experience with economic representation and research
agencies, the National Resources Planning Board and the Office of War
Mobilization and Reconversion and returns again to the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, indicating the way in which a failure to clarify purposes,
authority and procedure prevents necessary planning from being done. The
importance of the better organization of the Presidency, and the inadequacy
for operational planning of the agencies cited are effectively argued. "Plan-
ning leadership, then, in the last analysis must always depend upon the
personality of the chief executive." 2 There is no extended treatment of the
way in which the Presidency should be organized; on this question the un-
published study of OWMR and the Executive Office of the President by
H. M. Somers is penetrating and constructive and should be made available.
The final chapter presents the author's conclusions in brief and general
terms. The following passages summarize the argument, and indicate some
of its implications:
"Planning is the very essence of administrative management.' All govern-
mental activity implies purpose, in varying degrees of exactness. The
progress realized in the performance of any job depends in large measure
upon the care given to advance preparation. The minimum amount of
wastefulness is insured when these preparations have been made in detail.
Accomplishment can best be measured in terms of a defined goal, and of the
effort required in realizing it. Planning as an administrative technique does
not threaten our democratic liberties, or we would have long since ceased
to be a democracy.
"Planning is only the process by which we determine objectives, define
our immediate needs, and design a course of action with a corresponding
2 P. 163.
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scheduling of effort. No one wants to halt this process for any accepted
governmental activities. There may be those who would eliminate or curtail
some of the work piesently performed by government, but this is an entirely
different issue.
"National planning today simply means careful management in review-
ing and timing government activity as a whole. . . . National planning is
synonymous with Presidential management." I
While Millet stresses operational planning as true planning, the definition
of planning given in the second paragraph above points to other applications
of the term which the reviewer would include in the planning process. The
formulation of policy by parties and legislatures similarly calls for careful
preparation with the procedures and safeguards of staff work, as recent
studies of Congressional organization reveal. Again, the collection and ap-
praisal of the experience of administering policy with a view to formulating
from that experience revisions in policy to be submitted to the authoritative
policy-makers is another part of the process of government to which the
term- planning may properly be applied. The detailed application to any
given area-a farm, municipality, watershed or commodity region, for
example-of the administration of the policies of several units of govern-
ment calls for the planning process. Apparently these would all fit within
Millet's definitions, yet the emphasis, which characterizes much of his
argument, upon operation planning following from the already agreed policy
may lead him to reject this view. The National Resources Planning Board's
connection with "Long-Range Work and Relief Policies" might therefore be
considered as a proper task for a staff reporting to a national party conven-
tion charged with adopting a national platform; and not a proper activity
for operational planning in view of the existence of the Social Security Board,
in the first place, and the role of the President in policy formulation generally.
(Although it may be noted that the vaguely discerned function of party
leadership which the Presidency inevitably possesses does call for some in-
stitutional provisions for party policy formulation that Millet ignores in his
stressing of the role of the Presidency in management).
But we afe asking Mr. Millet to write another book, whereas our present
purpose is to indicate the virtues of this one. He has conveyed to the reader
his sense of the importance and urgency of careful thinking and responsible
action, and has advanced our means of understanding our government.
JOHN M. GAUSt
3. Pp. 179-80.
t Professor of Government, Harvard University.
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